The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory (Leavenworth Papers No. 21)
Dr. George W. Gawrych - The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory
Combat Studies Institute | 1996 | ASIN: B000BTATLK | English | 104 pages | PDF | 8.9 MB
Leavenworth Papers No. 21
Combat Studies Institute | 1996 | ASIN: B000BTATLK | English | 104 pages | PDF | 8.9 MB
Leavenworth Papers No. 21
Achieving a decisive victory in a short period with relatively few casualties stands as a desirable goal for modern armies in conventional war. The Six Day War of 5-10 June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) achieve such a military triumph over the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. As a result of this remarkable achievement, Israel emerged as the superpower in the Middle East, seemingly invincible in conducting maneuver warfare against any Arab coalition. Conventional wisdom, therefore, would counsel against challenging such a militarily superior foe in a major war. But Egypt and Syria subsequently risked just that by attacking Israel on 6 October 1973, less than seven years after their debacle. Acutely aware of the unfavorable odds, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat resorted to a war strategy designed to achieve political success without a military victory.