Dialog Theory for Critical Argumentation
Douglas Walton “Dialog Theory for Critical Argumentation"
John Benjamins Publishing Co | 2007-09-19 | ISBN: 9027218854 | 329 pages | PDF | 1,6 MB
John Benjamins Publishing Co | 2007-09-19 | ISBN: 9027218854 | 329 pages | PDF | 1,6 MB
Introduction
Recent developments in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence demand
a new look into the foundational notion of dialog around which the new dialectical
models of argumentation are being built. Two previous books, Commitment in
Dialogue (1995) and The New Dialectic (1998) postulated several distinctive types
of dialog, like persuasion dialog, information-seeking dialog, and deliberation.
The view that rational argument is based on a dialog framework is an ancient one
that was popular among the Greek philosophers. It was first systematically developed
as a field of logic by Aristotle. He called the study of how two parties reason
together by asking questions and offering replies and arguments dialectic, using
this already well-established term. But the field of study remained largely undeveloped
on the periphery of logic (Hamblin, 1970). It pretty much remained dormant
as an area for logical research for many centuries until its recent revival.1 Current
systems of dialectical argumentation recognize several distinctive types of dialog
seen as conversational settings that provide frameworks for argument use. The
motivating idea is to model an argument not just as a designated set of premises
and a conclusion, in the style of traditional logic, but as a speech act in which one
participant in a dialog puts forward a conclusion as a claim made with a set of
premises designed to provide support for that claim.
Dialog theory is beginning to be recognized as important, but there are not
many studies on it so far within argumentation.
Recent developments in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence demand
a new look into the foundational notion of dialog around which the new dialectical
models of argumentation are being built. Two previous books, Commitment in
Dialogue (1995) and The New Dialectic (1998) postulated several distinctive types
of dialog, like persuasion dialog, information-seeking dialog, and deliberation.
The view that rational argument is based on a dialog framework is an ancient one
that was popular among the Greek philosophers. It was first systematically developed
as a field of logic by Aristotle. He called the study of how two parties reason
together by asking questions and offering replies and arguments dialectic, using
this already well-established term. But the field of study remained largely undeveloped
on the periphery of logic (Hamblin, 1970). It pretty much remained dormant
as an area for logical research for many centuries until its recent revival.1 Current
systems of dialectical argumentation recognize several distinctive types of dialog
seen as conversational settings that provide frameworks for argument use. The
motivating idea is to model an argument not just as a designated set of premises
and a conclusion, in the style of traditional logic, but as a speech act in which one
participant in a dialog puts forward a conclusion as a claim made with a set of
premises designed to provide support for that claim.
Dialog theory is beginning to be recognized as important, but there are not
many studies on it so far within argumentation.