We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War
We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War By Matt M. Matthews
Publisher: CreateSpace 2008 | 104 Pages | ISBN: 1448676517 , 016079899X | PDF | 2 MB
Publisher: CreateSpace 2008 | 104 Pages | ISBN: 1448676517 , 016079899X | PDF | 2 MB
This analysis of the war includes examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF. The author argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field. Originally published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.